INTRODUCTION
The withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 1 dramatically disrupted the longstanding trade agenda of the Asia-Pacific. The region's governments have pursued trade and investment liberalization strategies for at least a quarter century, and many recently participated in both the TPP and Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. 2 Given the withdrawal of the United States, should the remaining members still move forward with the TPP? Should they seek instead bilateral agreements that the United States still seems interested in concluding? Or should the region simply focus on RCEP?
This Working Paper explores the choices facing Asia-Pacific governments from economic and political economy perspectives. The economic analysis presented here confirms that US withdrawal has been costly not only for the United States but also for its Asia-Pacific partners. But in addition, it shows that significant gains are possible from less rigorous but wide-membership trade agreements such as RCEP, and from high-quality trade agreements such as the TPP without the United States. As Schott (2017) noted, "bigger is better" with respect to Asia-Pacific trade agreements, but this analysis also shows that "better is bigger" in the sense that higher-quality agreements generate larger benefits. As explained below, these results are supported by simulation studies similar to those we conducted earlier for the TPP including the United States (Petri and Plummer 2016; Petri, Plummer, and Zhai 2012) . The withdrawal of the United States in some ways undermines but in others strengthens the rationale for Asia-Pacific regional integration. Since the region's economies have similar comparative advantages, improved access to the US market has long been a powerful incentive for concerted regional liberalization. Without the United States, regional negotiations have to manage competition among China, Southeast Asia, and India with overlapping fields of comparative advantage. But the technological capabilities and global reach of Asia-Pacific economies are growing rapidly, and the region has become central to global production systems. Meanwhile, the share of the United States in the exports of TPP11 countries has dropped from 40 to 35 percent over the last two decades. The region has a growing stake in the world trading system and its integration can enhance its global influence.
These arguments suggest an active, multitrack strategy to sustain economic integration in the Asia-Pacific, encompassing both wide-membership and high-quality agreements. Each has its political rationale, and the RCEP and TPP tracks might converge over time to create a regional system with high-quality rules among more advanced members and initially lower-quality rules among less advanced ones. Steps on this path will yield both economic benefits and stronger negotiating positions for members vis-à-vis global partners such as the United
States.
OPTIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Historically, the United States offered not only economic benefits but also leadership for Asia-Pacific inte- envisioned deepening these ties through the high-standard TPP agreement with 11 Asia-Pacific partners.
Without this external driver, the region will need to build a new, internal case for cooperation.
No New Regional Trade Agreements
Such new arguments may not be marshalled quickly enough and regional cooperation could move slowly or stall.
Although the role of the United States in the region has been declining, it remains a key market and complements Asia-Pacific comparative advantages; without the United States, Asia-Pacific groupings are dominated by mostly competitive economies. This is one reason why concerted liberalization within Asia is so difficult. The best results so far have been achieved in the ASEAN Economic Community (2015), based on strong political motives. China-Japan-Korea cooperation produced an investment agreement signed in 2012 and led to the start of negotiations on a trilateral free-trade agreement (FTA) in 2013, but there has not been much progress since.
The RCEP negotiations also began in 2013 after decades of discussions, and even that step has been attributed to pressure from the TPP. 4 Inertia is high.
The specific modeling assumptions used to conduct simulations are summarized in the next section. The "no new regional trade agreements" scenario is used as the baseline solution of this study, that is, as the businessas-usual growth path to which other results are compared. To be sure, this baseline does project some growth in regional interdependence due to market forces. 4. See, for example, Damuri (2016) .
5. Remaining liberalization of barriers in FTAs still being implemented is included in the baseline.
RCEP Advances
Greater formal integration is nevertheless possible as regional economies search for new engines of growth and as China turns to investments in connectivity and infrastructure, for example, through the Belt and Road Initiative.
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Such developments are also likely to fuel formal cooperation through RCEP and other regional mechanisms.
RCEP is the culmination of three decades of Asia-centered integration efforts. It was launched by the ASEAN process, 7 although China has played an important role in the negotiations Japanese leadership has improved the outlook for the TPP but challenges remain. For Japan, the Diet already passed the TPP and moving forward would sustain Japanese reforms and shape international rules-and perhaps lead to the return of the United States. For Australia and New Zealand, the TPP could push Asia toward more rigorous rules and offer new opportunities in agriculture. In August 2017, New Zealand approved a negotiating mandate for the TPP11 and its government expressed optimism about concluding it. 15 While
Vietnam was at first reluctant to join, since the benefits it expected from the TPP came largely from US markets, it remains engaged. However, Chile and Peru have become more committed to the Pacific Alliance, and Canada and Mexico have become embroiled in renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
As TPP11 negotiations proceed, some provisions of the original TPP, such as the controversial eight-year data-exclusivity protection for biologic drugs advocated by the United States, may be suspended. 16 Thus, some provisions that US negotiators fought hardest to achieve may now be falling by the wayside as the negotiations move forward without US participation. The resulting agreement may generate even stronger incentives for others to join. The agreement is structured as a "living agreement" with an accession clause designed to attract 12. These assumptions are based on previously cited sources as well as conversations with individuals familiar with the policy process. For a compendium of ongoing reports on the RCEP negotiations, see https://aric.adb.org/fta/ regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.
13. TPP Chapter 30 requires that at least 6 signature countries constituting 85 percent of aggregate TPP GDP (in 2013) ratify the agreement, and hence the agreement in its present form cannot move forward without the United States or Japan because the United States and Japan account for 60 and 17 percent of aggregate TPP GDP, respectively.
14. "Deputy foreign minister named as Japan's chief TPP negotiator," Japan Times, April 25, 2017, www.japantimes. co.jp/news/2017/04/25/business/deputy-foreign-minister-named-japans-chief-tpp-negotiator/#.WQBtuIjyiUk. new members. Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand all expressed interest in membership following the conclusion of the negotiations. At one stage China also expressed interest (Petri, Plummer, and Zhai 2014) and its membership, though controversial, would generate especially large benefits for all. Europe, with several bilateral FTAs in the region and a new one near completion with Japan, is another potential partner.
Significant expansion is possible-perhaps even probable-with potentially large economic and strategic benefits.
In modeling the TPP scenarios, we hypothesize an 11-member alternative (original members less the United States) and a 16-member alternative, adding the five economies listed above. These scenarios could be viewed as different phases of a TPP path. The high standards of the original agreement are assumed to apply to both, partly because opening the agreement to renegotiation is considered risky by most participants. However, we assume that the depth of nonpreferential reductions in nontariff barriers-the general effect of TPP provisions on regulating trade with all partners, or the so-called spillover effect-will be smaller than it would have been under TPP12 with the United States.
Bilateral Agreements with the United States
The United States is said to be ready to pursue bilateral FTAs that it can "win," if necessary by using security relationships as leverage. Early US statements about renegotiating NAFTA and the Korea-US FTA suggest that eliminating bilateral trade imbalances is the main objective of US policy. These emerging features of the US approach suggest that benefits to new bilateral partners may be quite limited, perhaps to preempt greater disruption in existing trade relationships through contingent protection. Moreover, bilateral FTAs cannot spur regional production networks, an important motivation for current Asia-Pacific integration.
The possibility of a bilateral FTA with Japan-the largest economy in the TPP after the United States itself-has been broached in the United States but Japan has resisted even the talk of negotiations so far. Japan runs a large bilateral surplus with the United States and has had frequent trade disputes with it; it is vulnerable to pressure. Liberalization of sectors important to both countries (agriculture, automobiles, and services) will be especially complicated to negotiate (Schott 2017 In modeling we take a less pessimistic position than these discussions might suggest, assuming that a real Japan-US FTA could be concluded with features similar to those of the TPP, but with less liberalization in some areas. We assume only half the nontariff barrier reductions negotiated in the TPP, no concessions in automobiles, and greater Japanese agricultural concessions.
POLICY SIMULATIONS
This study applies the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used by Petri and Plummer (2016) and Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2012) , now to analyze the effects of RCEP, TPP scenarios that exclude the United
States, and a US-Japan FTA. 17 Box 1 briefly describes the model. The model has an extensive publication history and its details are reported on our website, www.asiapacifictrade.org, and in a series of books and papers referenced or accessible on that site. Broadly, the model belongs to the family of CGE models that has served as the workhorse of trade policy analysis for several decades. However, it incorporates innovations based on recent advances in trade theory, including firm-level differences in productivity levels, and substantially more detailed policy parameters and data on international trade and investment barriers than are found in other similar studies. 18 The overall results of the model, say, for simulations of the original TPP12 agreement, generally fall in the middle of the range of studies conducted by other research groups; they were larger than results reported in older versions of CGE models and smaller than results in more speculative models incorporating some theoretical approaches. 18. The properties of this model are examined in Zhai (2008) . The modeling approach yields somewhat larger effects than the usual Armington formulation.
19. Descriptions of the baseline can be found in Petri and Plummer (2016) .
20. We also ran simulations of a TPP5 scenario, which includes only Australia, Brunei, Japan, Singapore, and New Zealand. This small group of open economies has been recently mentioned in media speculations as it could quickly adopt the TPP agreement. However, the gains from an agreement among already open economies would also be small, accounting for only about ¼ of TPP11's already modest benefits. The TPP16 (TPP11 plus Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand) generates the greatest benefits among the new alternatives examined in this paper, with income gains of $449 billion globally and $486 billion for member economies (member-economy gains are in fact higher than in the TPP12 itself).
The most prominent beneficiaries, in absolute terms, are Japan, Korea, and Taiwan The US-Japan bilateral agreement is the least attractive among the alternatives examined, with global income gains of $120 billion. Both Japanese and US gains would fall far short of benefits under the TPP12. But the parameters used to simulate the agreement (as described in table 1) may be still too optimistic. If the US administration directed negotiators to prioritize smaller bilateral trade imbalances rather than greater mutual gains from trade, an unusual requirement not supported by economic logic, the bilateral scenario would yield even lower gains.
The RCEP agreement generates global income gains of $286 billion. This reflects, on one hand, the economic scale of RCEP-its member economies have the largest combined GDP among all alternatives examined-and on the other, the relative weakness of RCEP provisions. As already noted, the RCEP negotiations are shaping 21. Kawasaki (2017) also uses a computable general equilibrium model to estimate the effects of TPP11, Japan-US FTA, and RCEP alternatives. He finds larger results in part due to two assumptions that differ substantially from those made in this study. First, Kawasaki assumes 50 percent elimination of nontariff barriers, while our results are derived from the expected provisions of the agreements and generally reflect less liberalization. Second, he assumes that 50 percent of liberalization measures agreed in the FTAs would be implemented on a most-favorednation basis, that is, would apply to all partners rather than those in the agreement. We assume a significantly lower 20 percent spillover rate in the TPP12 analysis, and an even lower 10 percent spillover effect from the smaller agreements analyzed in this study. China is the biggest loser in the TPP scenarios in terms of income losses-due to both trade diversion and the erosion of its preferential treatment in the integrating markets-but in all cases the effects are small. 22. This result derives mainly from the lower spillover assumptions used in the scenarios of this study, as explained in the previous footnote. The spillover effect occurs due to close monitoring of the implementation of an agreement and is assumed not to occur in the same degree under the smaller regional agreements analyzed in this paper as in the TPP12.
CONCLUSIONS
23. Michael Froman, "Trade, Growth and Jobs," Cabinet Exit Memo, 5 January, 2017, p. 7, https://insidetrade.com/ sites/insidetrade.com/files/documents/jan2017/USTR%20Exit%20Memo.pdf.
n Bilateral agreements, even among big countries like Japan and the United States, offer far more limited benefits than regional agreements.
n High-quality agreements lead to substantially larger gains than less rigorous ones. For example, the TPP16 agreement could produce more than double the gains of RCEP, even though the TPP16 economies have only half the GDP of the RCEP region.
What can Asia-Pacific policymakers take from these results? They show that regional action can produce benefits. All regional alternatives explored in this study generated greater gains than a bilateral agreement spanning two of the world's three largest economies, Japan and the United States. Both the scale and quality of regional agreements matter. Even if no large, high-quality agreement can be concluded now, one could be built over time. The gains from a TPP11 agreement might be multiplied three-fold by adding five plausible partners.
Similarly, an RCEP agreement might open a path to steady, future improvements. In other words, there is a strong case for accelerating formal economic integration in the Asia-Pacific on multiple tracks.
For the United States the implications are more negative. The United States would forego the benefits of participating deeply in the integration of a very dynamic region. In addition, newly emerging forms of regional integration would exclude the United States. For example, US exporters would lose some markets relative to the baseline in most scenarios analyzed in this Working Paper. Direct economic losses would be modest at first, but greater costs would follow as large economies, including China, India, and Japan, begin to shape regional rules-on trade, investment, intellectual property, the digital economy, state-owned enterprises, labor, and so on-to their own advantage. These trends would validate some of Froman's concerns. To be sure, by creating stronger Asian economies and markets, regional integration may also eventually encourage the United States to revisit its engagement with the Asia-Pacific.
Box 1 The computable general equilibrium model
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis accounts for interactions among firms, households, and governments in multiple product markets in multiple countries and regions of the world economy. Firms are assumed to maximize profits and consumers to maximize utility. After transfers among firms, households, and governments, incomes are spent on goods, or are saved and invested, both at home and abroad. The model finds an equilibrium solution by calculating prices that make supply equal demand for each product and factor of production (labor, capital, and land) in every region. The effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) are simulated by introducing changes in tariffs and other parameters (see table 1 ), finding a new equilibrium, and comparing new prices, output, trade, income, and demand to baseline levels.
The mathematical structure of a CGE model reflects assumptions about market competition, trade patterns, consumer preferences, production technology, market equilibrium conditions, factor supplies, taxes, and many other economic relationships. These assumptions are represented by inputoutput tables, elasticities, and other parameters-for example, how consumption demand responds to income. Data are collected from multiple sources and the model is calibrated to yield an initial solution that matches data for a benchmark year (in our model, 2015) . Simulations then predict the evolution of economies over time, including policy interventions. Because CGE models represent medium-and long-term changes, they assume normal levels of employment and do not incorporate features to analyze short-term macroeconomic fluctuations. Simulations in this Working Paper are based on a 19-sector, 29-region model, based on a specification by Zhai (2008) . Parameters and data sources are shown in Petri and Plummer (2016) .
The model is dynamic in that simulations track changes in saving rates that affect capital accumulation over time. However, the model does not include other dynamic factors proposed in the literature, such as productivity increases from the accumulation of knowledge and other endogenous growth effects, induced inflows of foreign technology and capital, and follow-up trade liberalization that may result from new trade agreements. Introducing such effects can dramatically change the results, as demonstrated by Todo (2013) . The model and its results are described in detail on www.asiapacifictrade.org. 
